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SYMPOSIUM:
REFINANCING OF THIRD WORLD DEBT*
LOAN AGREEMENTS BETWEEN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES AND FOREIGN COMMERCIAL
BANKS-REFLECTIONS ON SOME LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ISSUES
A. 0. Adede**
The third world loans of the American banks are still the most
controversial and most worrying part of their international business,
even if the wilder fears expressed earlier in 1976 have been discredited. Or, to put it more properly, the experience has not been good,
but international banks seem so far to have had sound shock absorbers.
Argentina, Peru, Indonesia, Zaire and other countries have experienced difficulty in meeting their debt repayments at the proper
time and have had to persuade their creditors either to refinance
existing loans as they have fall en due or to agree to stretch-outs of
the original payment schedules. 1

I.

A.

INTRODUCTION

The Scope of the Article

The theme of this symposium is refinancing the Third World
debt. The symposium is restricted to a discussion ofloans made by
foreign commercial banks. Thus, it does not deal with the general
question of international lending to developing countries, the sub*Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Regional Meeting of the American Society of
International Law, held in Syracuse, N. Y., on April 9, 1977 at the Syracuse University College
of Law. The views expressed by the participants do not reflect their official capacities or
that of their organizations.
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Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; LL.B. Boston University School of Law (1971).
Formerly Head of the Legal Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kenya.
Currently of the Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations Secretariat, New York. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the
Organization.
1. Third World Risks, Joust for Supremacy: A Survey of American Financial Institutions, EcoNOMIST, Jan. 22, 1977, at survey 25 (the survey is separately paginated and begins
after page 56) (emphasis added). It was recently observed that "American banks have loaned
almost $50 billion to less developed countries. With the increased price of oil, these countries
are running larger deficits than the bankers expected." Bailing Out Our Banks Abroad, N.Y.
Times, March 6, 1977, § 4 (Week in Review) at 16, col. 1.
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ject of a symposium elsewhere. 2 Also excluded from discussion at
this symposium is the question of the official development assistance loans given by the governments of capital-exporting nations
and those given by international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). Nevertheless, some observations must be made at the outset regarding the entire debt problem
facing the developing countries and the actions suggested to deal
with the problem, especially the suggestions that have come from
within the United Nations.
B.

The United Nations and the Debts of the Developing Countries

At its Seventh Special Session, the General Assembly of the
United Nations addressed itself to the debt-servicing problems of
the developing countries as follows:
The burden of debt on developing countries is increasing to a
point where the import capacity as well as reserves have come under
serious strain. At its fourth session the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development shall consider the need for, and the
possibility of, convening as soon as possible a conference of major
donor, creditor and debtor countries to devise ways and means to
mitigate this burden, taking into account the development needs of
developing countries, with special attention to the plight of the most
seriously affected countries .... 3

Prior to its fourth session, 4 the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) had embarked on a study of
the debt problem of the developing countries. The Ad hoc Group of
Governmental Experts on Debt Problems of Developing Countries
was created by resolution of UNCTAD's Committee on Invisibles
and Financing Related to Trade
to consider inter alia the debt problems of developing countries and
the various possible international measures to be taken and to study
the factors affecting the future levels of debt-servicing obligations
in country situations without suggesting measures with regard to
renegotiation of the debt of individual countries and measures
2. Symposium-International Lending: The Case for Developing Nations, 7 VAND. J.
L. 551 (1974).
3. G.A. Res. 3362, 29 U.N. GAOR, Seventh Special Session, Supp. (No. 1) 5, U.N. Doc.
N10301 (1975).

TRANSNAT'L

4. The fourth session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
Board (UNCTAD IV) was held in Nairobi, Kenya, in May and June of 1976.
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which could be taken to keep external debt-servicing obligations
within manageable levels with the object of avoiding debt crises and
consequent harm to the developmental objectives of the developing
countries. The resolution further stated that the Group should deal
with these problems in a manner that would safeguard both the
legitimate interests of the creditors and the developmental objectives of the debtor countries, and have regard also to the fact that
debt problems differ from country to country and that solutions
should be adapted to specific conditions. 5

In its report, the Ad hoc Group, in conformity with its mandate,
discussed the economic context in which the significance of debtservicing payments is to be evaluated, 6 the question of avoiding
debt-servicing difficulties, 7 and suggested certain remedial measures.R By the time UNCTAD IV was convened in 1976, the developing countries' current account deficits had shot from $9 billion in
1973, to $28 billion in 1974, and to more than $35 billion in 1975. 9 It
was predicted that the total debt, as opposed to current account
deficits, would be in the neighborhood of $180-190 billion by 1976, 10
and that the level would continue to increase. 11
The primary purposes for such heavy borrowing by the developing countries were taking care of balance of payments problems,
investment, procuring working capital and meeting unexpected or
disruptive situations. The above cited figures refer to debts, including public loans from capital-exporting states, loans from the IMF
and the IBRD, and also loans from the international commercial
banks. The developing countries at UNCTAD IV pressed for the
following solutions: (1) waiver or cancellation of official debts (principal and the related debt-servicing payments) with respect to the
most seriously affected countries; (2) debt relief, in the form of
conversion of official debts into grants with respect to the least
developed among the developing countries; (3) consolidation of
5. Debt Problems of Developing Countries, Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental
Experts on its Third Session, (Aug. 5, 1975) (mimeo only) 2, U.N. Doc. TD/B/545 (1975).
6. Id. (Agenda Item 3) at 5-9.
7. Id. (Agenda Item 4) at 10-13.
8. Id. (Agenda Item 5) at 14-16. For further discussion, see Corea, The Debt Problem of
Developing Countries, 9 J. DEV. PLAN. 53 (1976).
9 . Shapiro, Monitoring : Are the Banks Biting Off More Than They Can Chew?
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Oct., 1976, at 140, 141.
10. Pakenham, The Debts of Less Developed Countries-The Challenge for Commercial
Ranks, J. CoM. BANK LENDING, May, 1976, at 19.
11. For further discussion on the future debt levels, see The Poor World's Debt,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 2, 1976, at 78.
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commercial debt of certain countries interested in this approach,
and rescheduling of payments; (4) the establishment of an ad hoc
international fund to refinance, at a commercial interest rate but
with maturities of around 15 years; and (5) the convening of a
debtor-creditor conference to deal with general principles that
would guide the renegotiation of both official and commercial
debts. 12
The industrialized countries which attended UNCTAD IV
found it difficult to accept these suggestions. Nevertheless, the developing countries' representatives at the Paris North/South dialogue have continued to press for them. 13
C. The Case Against a Generalized Approach to the Debt
Problems of Developing Countries
It should be observed at the outset that the developing countries whose debt problems are being discussed herein are those
which are now being designated as non-oil developing countries.
However, non-oil developing countries should not be lumped together into one group when proposing solutions to their debt problems. The UNCTAD study supports this view in the context of debt
renegotiation procedures. 14 Economists have unequivocally stated
that the deficit problems of the non-oil developing countries are "so
12. Money and Finance and Transfer of Real Resources for Development, International
Financial Co-operation for Development, Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat [UNCTAD
NJ (May 5, 1976) (mimeo only) 16-19, U.N. Doc. TD/188 (1975). For further discussion, see
The Poor World's Debt, supra note 11, at 78-79.
13. For a discussion of the issues raised in the Paris Conference on International Economic Co-operation, see Smith, Changing Configurations of Power in North-South Relations
Since 1945, 31 INT'L ORGANIZATION 1 (1977).
14. The UNCTAD study agreed that
there is some merit in the view that it is not possible to establish general criteria for
debt relief applicable to all countries and that debt problems should be treated on
an individual case-by-case basis since these problems reflect external or internal
conditions peculiar to particular developing countries.
Money and Finance and Transfer of Real Resources for Development, IRternational Financial
Co-operation for Development, Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat [UNCTAD IV] (May
5, 1976) (mimeo only) 17, U.N. Doc. TD/188 (1975). However, the study concluded that the
current debt problems of developing countries
are not the result of specific external circumstances peculiar to particular countries,
nor do they reflect mismanagement on the part of those countries. The problem has
clearly a more general dimension since it springs from maladjustment in the world
economy and is beyond the ability of developing countries to control.
Id. The case-by-case negotiation of developing countries' debt was one of the specific measures suggested in Part Il of Resolution 3202 of the Sixth Special Session of the General
Assembly. G.A. Res. 3202(h), 29 U.N. GAOR, Sixth Special Session, Supp. (No. 1) 8, U.N.
Doc. N9559 (1974).
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different that a blanket solution could be counterproductive." 15
Treating the non-oil developing countries as a homogeneous
group is, indeed, a mistake. In the context of a discussion of their
debt problems, the non-oil developing countries fall into several
groups, so designated for various reasons.
In one group, for example, belong the significant debtors such
as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, the Phillippines, South Korea,
and Taiwan, all of whom have heavily borrowed from foreign commercial banks and whose total debt, in 1975, exceeded by fifty per
cent the entire current-account deficit of the non-oil developing
countries. 16 These countries are considered members of a highincome group, as opposed to the low-income group to which Zaire
belongs. 17 However, all of these nations, including Zaire, an equally
heavy borrower from foreign commercial banks, belong to a group
which bankers themselves have referred to as their "partners" and
not simply "debtors~" It is evident, therefore, that this group of
significant debtors, because of its active participation in the international monetary market, is different from the group of non-oil
developing countries which have not borrowed heavily from the international commercial banks and which have not overstretched
their general debt commitments.
Commenting, not on the heavy borrowing by these non-oil developing countries, but on the equally soaring loans from Western
commercial banks to the Soviet Bloc, a Swiss banker said, "Make
a small loan and you have created a debtor. Make a large loan and
you have created a partner." 11' An American banker explained that
a "very big debtor has great influence over a bank, because he can
embarrass it, or even ruin it, by refusing to repay." 19
Another distinction exists between non-oil developing countries. Some of the non-oil developing countries have other mineral
industries which can be used as collateral for commercial loans.
Other non-oil developing countries, which do not have such endowments, must rely upon their ability to maintain a rate of growth
capable of creating confidence upon which the lenders can rely. It
15. The Poor World's Debt, supra note 11, at 79.
16. Id.
17. The case of Zaire is of great interest because the agreement reached to refinance its
debts with the commercial bank lenders came about as a result of the 1976 scares about debt
defaulting. For further discussion, see note 40 infra and accompanying text.
18. Janssen, Debt Threat: Soviet Bloc Borrowings From the West Surge, Amid Mystery,
Fears, Wall St. J., Feb. 22, 1977, at 20, col. 1.
19. Id.
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is thus usually regarded as a sign of economic and political stability
if a non-oil developing country gets an unsecured loan from an international commercial bank.
There is also a group of non-oil developing countries whose
main problem is not the high costs of servicing debts. These countries, instead, are troubled with inadequate resource transfers, defined as "gross disbursement of grants and loans less debt service
payments." 20 This group is clearly to be distinguished from another
group made up of countries which have severe problems because of
their heavy dependence upon the export of one or two commodities,
leaving them with a limited access to the world capital market. This
latter group is "extremely vulnerable to being squeezed out of commercial borrowing altogether. " 21
Having examined the concern of the United Nations with the
debt problems of non-oil developing countries and the impropriety
of a generalized approach to their problems, the remaining sections
of this introduction will be devoted to a brief survey of the extent
of commercial banks' involvement in this matter, the rationale behind the extensive lending to the developing countries, and related
economic issues.
D. The Magnitude of the Foreign Commercial Banks' Loans to
Developing Countries and the Economic Rationale

International commercial banks have increased their lending to
the non-oil developing countries from virtually nothing in the 1960's
to the level of providing about 65% of the total financial needs of
the developing countries in 1975. 22 Of the $41 billion deficit of the
non-oil developing countries in 1975, $15 billion was financed by
private commercial banks, chiefly from the United States and the
Euromarket commercial banks. 23 There are certain problems which
may be said to exist as a result of the current trend of commercial
banks in becoming so involved in financing developing countries'
balance of payments deficits. Many observers fear that commercial
20. Money and Finance and Transfer of Real Resources for Development, International
Financial Co-operation for Development, Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat [UNCTAD
IV] (May 5, 1976) (mimeo only) 14 n.6, U.N. Doc. TD/188 (1975).
21. The Poor World's Debt, supra note 11, at 78-79.
22. focked in with the Poor, ECONOMIST, Dec. 25, 1976, at 76.
23. The $35 billion deficit of the developing countries in 1975 was financed as follows:
$17 billion by official development aid and private investments; $3 billion by borrowing from
the IMF and drawing on national exchange reserves; and $15 billion by the private commercial banks. Capital Flows and International Economic Development, 1976 AM. Soc'y INT'L L.
PRoc. 80, 81.
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banks may be compelled to monitor the economic performance of
the developing countries to which they lend. This may result in far
reaching political consequences involving not only the destinies of
the commercial banks themselves, and those of their clients, but
also the relationship between the non-oil developing country borrowers and the home countries of the lending banks. Although this
problem is considered overblown by some bankers, the following
statement is indicative of the seriousness of this issue:
It goes without saying that the sheer magnitude of the banks' loans
to LDCs [less developed countries] means that bankers feel duty
bound to make increasing demands upon the LDCs that seek their
funds. But carrying this to its logical conclusion conjures up age-old
fears of domination of the Poor by the Rich; of renewed Dollar
Diplomacy by the U.S.; of exploitation of previous colonies by a host
of Western nations-and a renewal of all the worst charges that have
been heaped upon multinational corporations. And it's not just the
borrowers who have such fears; some of the lenders do, too. 24

It has been legitimately asked whether private commercial
banks, which are evidently only too willing to continue to lend to
non-oil developing countries, 25 have the ability to manage these
loans. The commercial banks may be compelled to undertake the
unorthodox task of monitoring the economic performances of the
developing countries in order to ensure conditions of repayment of
the loans. 26 Monitoring loans, as such, has traditionally been done
only by the IMF and the IBRD. But, recently a group of private
commercial banks entered into a loan agreement which included a
right to monitor the economic performance of the developing country.27 Further loans may be conditioned upon the bank finding that
24. Shapiro, supra note 9, at 140.
25. American Banks Take Another Trip Abroad, ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 1976, at 131;
Docked in with the Poor, supra note 22, at 76.
26. For further discussion on monitoring the economic performa11ces of the developing
countries, see notes 32-38 infra and accompanying text. For a thorough discussion of the
IMF's monitoring of exchange rate problems, see Edwards, The Currency Exchange Rate
Provisions of the Proposed Amended Articles of the Agreement of the International Monetary
Fund, 70 AM. J. lNT'L L. 722, 753 (1976); Meien, The "Jamaica Agreement," International
Monetary Reform, and the Developing Countries, 11 J. lNT'L L. & ECON. 67, 86-88 (1976).
27. In order to negotiate a $300 million balance of payment loan from a syndicate made
up of Bank of America, Chase Manhattan, Citicorp, Manufacturers Hanover, Morgan Guaranty and Wells Fargo, Peru recently agreed to a bank monitoring process as a condition to
receiving the loan. The banks separated payment of the loan proceeds into two equal installments. The second payment was contingent on Peru's satisfactory implementation of an
economic stabilization program. Many observers voiced concern over the prospect of the
commercial banks controlling Peru's economic destiny. One observer noted that "[t]o meet
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the borrower has maintained an economic performance conducive
to loan repayment.
It is important to explore, briefly, the economic realities which
seem to have encouraged banks to continue approving large loans
to the non-oil developing countries, in spite of a persistent fear of
default. 211 One explanation offered for this situation is as follows:
Faced with a build-up of Opec deposits and a decline in loan demand from traditional borrowers, . . . [commercial banks] have
been desperate to find some other outlet for their cash. They thus
increased their net medium-term lending to the developing countries through the Euro-currency market from virtually nothing in
the mid-1960's ... to $9.5 billion in 1975. They also increased their
net short-term lending in the form of export credits from $1.5 billion
in 1972 to $4 billion in 1975. By the end of 1975, private capital
markets were providing 65% of the total financial needs of the developing countries . . . .29

Commenting on the $20.6 billion which the American banks
alone are said to have loaned to the developing countries in 1976,
the United States Commerce Department is reported to have acknowledged that "the increase in foreign lending reflected weak
domestic loan demand resulting from the recession as well as declining interest rates in the United States, which made yields available
the bankers' terms, for example, Peru sold off its state-owned fishing fleet, devalued its
currency, and stopped state subsidies for labor." Bailing Out Our Banks Abroad, supra note
1. The bankers responded that the Peruvians themselves developed and implemented the
economic program and that the banks did not dictate any such program to them. Bellivean,
What the Peru Experiment Means, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Oct. 1976, at 145, 148.
28. The banks have continued to make loans even though the political climates of developing countries are believed to be unstable. The following remarks are said to have been made
by certain western economists while discussing the problems which may occur if American
commercial banks engage in monitoring the economic performance of developing countries
borrowers:
"we're talking about LDCs where people don't understand banking or even markets.
Most of the enterprises they know are run by the state or beholden to it. And their
political leaders may be demagogues of the first order, who'd love to blame their
economic problems on somebody. It doesn't take much to whip up the peasantry with
stories about the House of Morgan and U.S. imperialism to explain why there's no
food." To which another observer adds: "When the going gets tough, either they
blame the banks or the home countries. Let's say they blame the banks. That's fine
for the U.S. State Department, but terrible for the banks, which may end up getting
expropriated or thrown out of the country when they need a villain." Either way, it's
likely that if U.S. commercial banks are perceived as having put pressure on foreign
governments, it could be a disaster for America's foreign policy.
Shapiro, supra note 9, at 142.
29. Locked in with the Poor, supra note 22, at 76.
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elsewhere more attractive. " 30
The necessary analysis of the extent and the rationale behind
the commercial banks' involvement emphasizes also that "thirdworld borrowers are likely to suffer from payment deficits for years
to come and will therefore be chronically short of foreign currency
needed to repay." 31 If this condition persists, it is clear that commercial banks are assured of continued demands for loans from their
overseas clients which have become profitable outlets ,for their
funds. Thus, commercial banks will continue to be the alternatives
to the IMF compensatory financing or the borrowing on the national
tranches, for developing countries seeking loans for financing balance of payments deficits.
E. The Sources of Loans for Financing Developing Countries'
Balance of Payments Deficits

With respect to the specific problem of balance of payments
deficits, the developing countries have the choice of either approaching the IMF and borrowing on their national tranches, or
approaching the commercial banks for the necessary loan. One must
wonder why a developing country would prefer approaching commercial banks for loans which generally carry higher interest rates
and shorter maturity terms, instead of going to the IMF, whose
interest rates are generally lower. Certain explanations are available.
One reason for prefering commercial banks' loans is that certain
developing countries may want to avoid the IMF's stringent surveillance of the economic performance of the borrowing country. 32 As
observed earlier, the commercial banks are preferable because they
do not ordinarily wish to monitor the economic performance of their
clients. 33 It has been observed that the developing countries resent
the surveillance by the IMF, whose personnel are sometimes regarded in a developing country borrower as "police in the ghettos
areas." The IMF supervision becomes more stringent as a country
borrows on the later tranches. In order to measure the effects of
lending to a given country, the IMF and other international lending
30. Lewis, U.S. Banks Raised Foreign Lending to a Record $20.6 Billion for 1976, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 18, 1977, § D, at 1, col. 5.
31. Locked in with the Poor, supra note 22, at 76. Financial assistance from the oilexporting Arab nations may change the situation. See Saudis Pledge $1 Billion for Black
Africa as 59-Nation Parley Starts in Cairo, N.Y. Times, March 8, 1977, at 1, col. 2.
32. See note 26 supra.
33. Compare, however, the case of Peru discussed in note 27, supra.
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institutions such as the IBRD, the International Development Bank
(IDB), the Agency for International Development (AID), and even
the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) are interested
in monitoring the operational effects of the loan, 34 the technical
effect, 35 the financial effect, 38 the economic effect, 37 and the socio34. The operational effect of the lending, the first critical effect which should be evaluated, is analyzed by asking the following questions:
(1) Were the loan funds spent for the purposes intended? (2) Were the appropriate
physical and human inputs actually put into the project? (3) Was the road or plant
actually built? Indeed, was the project actually completed? and (4) Was the project
completed on time and within cost estimates?
Widdicombe, The Effects of International Lending Programs in the Developing Nations, 7
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 593, 600 (1974).
35. The technical effect of international lending deals in large part with the qualitative
aspects of the project. Technical effect is analyzed by asking the following questions:
(1) Was the bridge or road technically well constructed? (2) Did the project meet or
surpass normal local technical standards? (3) Did the project set new standards of
timing, economy or quality of work? (4) Did the project bring any new technology or
new methods to the country? and (5) Was any such new technology of a type which
could be applied at a reasonable cost elsewhere in the country?
Id. at 600-01.
36. In measuring the financial effects of international lending a banker is expected to
be concerned mainly with this basic question: Can the borrower repay the loan as expected?
An affirmative answer should indicate that the loan created the desired "effect" from the
point of view of the bankers who are all afraid of defaults. Id. at 601.
37. It is difficult to isolate and quantify the economic effect of international lending. The
following questions can be asked to ascertain the "macro" economic effect of international
lending:
(1) Has international lending really stimulated domestic capital formation or has it
been diverted into short-term consumption projects with no growth effects? (2) Has
international lending further exacerbated the dichotomy found in most developing
countries; that is, has it fostered the rapid development of a small modern sector of
the economy while ignoring the larger traditional sector of the economy? (3) Has
international lending led to a concentration of economic power and to the fostering
of monopoly situations in the borrowing countries? (4) Has international lending led
to an "unequal" distribution of income in the developing countries? (5) Has international lending, with its frequent "tied" procurement conditions, meant that the
developing countries have had to pay higher prices for the importation of capital and
other goods?
Id. at 603.
The following questions can be asked in order to determine the effect at the country
economy level, the industrial sector level, and even at the "micro" level of a single important
firm:
( 1) Has international lending favored transportation or industry over agriculture or
mining? (2) Has international lending focused only on the productive sectors while
ignoring infrastructure and the social sectors? (3) Has international lending only gone
to the high profit, leading-edge industries such as pharmaceuticals while ignoring the
basic industries of steel and power production? (4) Has international lending been
concerned only with large-scale farmers while forgetting the credit problems of small
peasant farmers?
Id. at 603.
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political effect. 38 Apart from the reluctance to approach the IMF
because of the monitoring practice, certain developing countries are
also reluctant to approach-the IMF because doing so amounts to an
admission that the country has failed to run itself properly. 39
Other developing countries may avoid the IMF and go to commercial banks, not because of a fear of the IMF's monitoring practice, or of the risk of appearing as having failed to manage themselves properly, but instead to demonstrate that they are capable
of putting their houses in order. Commercial banks only lend to
countries upon a showing of each country's ability to maintain a
healthy economic growth, conducive to the repayment of the loans.
A developing country may return to the banks for more loans to
demonstrate its political and economic stability, which, in turn may
attract foreign investment. This practice could easily lead a country
into a serious debt problem. The country may become unavoidably
saddled with debt-servicing problems and, as a result, overstretch
its borrowing limits. Thus, while borrowing from the IMF may not
38. In determining the socio-political effect of international lending, the subtlest to
evaluate and possibly the most important aspect of the lending program, the following questions are pertinent:
(1) Does the lending precipitate the borrowing country into a dependency position
with regard to the lender company, country, or international public bank? (Putting
the question in the language of the man on the street in the developing country: "Are
foreign devils controlling our country as a result of these international loans?") In
this regard, ownership is the key issue involved. In many developing countries loan
capital, especially from the "official" or public sector, is considered politically neutral or inoffensive because the loan, in effect, takes first claim on nothing more than
the local portion of the project's cash flow. Equity capital from foreign sources, on
the other hand, is considered politically biased, exploitive, or unnecessary. (2) Does
the proposed lending program support or distort national development priorities and
plans? (3) Does the lending involve the taking away of scarce national resources, or
does the loan involve "foreign exploitation" of the country's national resources? (4)
Does the lending improve the ability and the capacity of the country to feed, house
and clothe its citizens? (5) Does the lending foster a democratic, popularparticipation government? Does it encourage positive government reaction to the
citizen's problems?
Id. at 604-05.
In the socio-economic sphere, the following questions are pertinent:
(1) What effect does the lending program have on employment and underemployment, salary levels and working conditions? (2) Does the lending relieve conditions in depressed areas, reduce rural-urban migration,· reduce income disparities
and, generally, create higher family incomes? (3) Does the lending encourage the
development of domestic entrepreneurs and managers? ·(4) Does the international
lending program-public or private-spur the spirit of development and modernization in the country?
Id. at 605.
39. Bellivean, supra note 27, at 146.
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be considered ideal in all situations, the alternative of approaching
the commercial banks is not a problem-free solution. Because of the
legitimate desire of keeping these two options open, it is quite understandable why certain developing countries do not want to accept a generalized approach to the solution of their debt problems
and would refrain from supporting a solution that would affect their
credit worthiness with the commercial banks.
F. The Case for the Participation of the Commercial Banks and
the IMF in a Single Loan Transaction

Actual practice seems to indicate that commercial banks have
devised a system in which a developing country client is compelled
to go first to the IMF for part of the loan, and then approach the
banks for the rest. The IMF involvement is important for the banks
in that the necessary surveillance is undertaken by the IMF. The
treatment of Zaire's debt problem is a case in point.
Apart from paying $34 million of the $44 million arrears in
principal to a neutral financial agency for the purpose of repaying
its commercial bank lenders, Zaire was also encouraged by the commercial banks to apply to the IMF for the national tranches to which
it is entitled. The IMF loan, with its stringent supervisory conditions, was to bring about $96 million towards the total medium-term
de ht of $450-500 million. 40
The involvement of the IMF would "provide the bankers with,
they hope, a financial traffic cop. " 41 The IMF and the other official
lending agencies are better placed than the private commercial
banks to push countries that have become financially over-extended
into making changes in their national economic policies. Accordingly, joint financing programs between the commercial banks and
the other international lending institutions are entered into more
frequently. Illustrative of this point is the case of Brazil.
The IBRD, in 1975, made a $95 million loan to Brazil, together
with two commercial bank loans of $55 million. 42 The service pay40. For further discussion of the repayments of Zaire's loans and how the problem turned
into a law suit between American commercial banks and the Export-Import Bank of the
United States, see Attacking the Ex-Im Bank: Who Should Get Paid First?, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR, Oct. 1976, at 46-48; Banks Carry on Lending to the Poor: Zaire Refinanced,
ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 1976, at 99; In and Out of Court, Joust for Supremacy: A Survey of
American Financial Institutions, ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 1977, at survey 35 (the survey is separately paginated and begins after page 56).
41. Banks Carry on [_,ending to the Poor: Zaire Refinanced, supra note 40, at 99.
42. The Poor World's Debt, supra note 11, at 78, 79.
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ments were made due to the commercial banks and channeled
through the IBRD. It should be noted that this type of joint financing will tend to help only the "well-off. "'3
By turning towards various forms of co-financing programs with
official lending agencies, commercial banks are demonstrating that
they are as persistent in ensuring repayments as they are in their
continued lending. Banks will continue to guard against default in
payment situations because of the possible multiplier effect which
could ruin their banking business."
The commercial banks take the position that repayment of
their loans must be given priority over the repayment of the loans
given by governments and other public lending institutions, which
do not pay dividends, are not responsible to the shareholders, and
have a freer hand in the use of the public money they loan.
II.
A.

THE LEGAL ISSUES

Suggested Approach to a Loan Agreement

The commercial banks are not loaning the non-oil developing
countries money for meeting chroni~ debt problems as an act of
benevolence, and therefore, the protection of the banks' interest
should not be paramount. Commercial banks have found, in the
non-oil developing countries, a necessary market for their surplus
funds. Thus, they are doing business guided by the usual profitmaking motive. Accordingly, the extent of the protection of their
rights and interests in a loan agreement must be weighed properly
against the equally necessary protection of rights and interests of
the developing country recipients of the loan.
The non-oil developing countries have both short-term and
long-term economic development problems. Borrowing funds for
taking care of economic development problems is a task which each
country undertakes in accordance with its particular needs. The
expected repayment of loans on schedule may, however, be disrupted because of certain unforeseen events, thus frustrating the
achievement of the legitimate goals for which the loan was obtained.
Problems such as this, as noted in the UNCTAD study, are the
43. Id. Private banks seem reluctant to move into unfamiliar countries and private
institutional lenders, said to be generally conservative, tend to be selective of their borrowers.

Id.
44. For further discussion on the question of default generally, see Greene, Financing
Foreign Governments and Official Entities, in Orr SHORE LENDING Bv U.S. COMMERCIAL
BANKS 187, 206 (F. Mathis ed. 1975).
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result of "maladjustment in the world economy and beyond the
ability of developing countries control. " 45 The interest of the developing country borrower in fulfilling the original legitimate economic
development goal ought to be fully protected by ensuring that the
terms of the loan agreement are flexible enough to take such realities into account.
It is easily seen why, in loan renegotiation, avoiding default
situations becomes a crucial issue. Both the lenders and the borrowers have an interest in avoiding defaults in loan payments. The
lenders are afraid of the possible multiplier effect of the default
which could ruin their business. 46 The borrowing countries are afraid
that a default will tarnish their credit worthiness in the eyes of the
commercial banks. Care must accordingly be taken to avoid making
a loan agreement an instrument which predominantly protects only
the interest of the lender. Also to be avoided is the use of the loan
agreement as an instrument on the basis of which the developing
country borrowers remain at the mercy of constant harassment and
humiliation by otherwise avoidable legal actions instituted by lenders claiming breach of one sort or another.
A loan agreement must create a balanced legal relationship
between the parties in order to work for the benefit of both. It should
not create a legal relationship which is easily made unworkable or
which can be terminated prematurely by a party claiming the nonfulfillment of numerous provisions cleverly skewed in its favor in
the instrument. Banks are not to be expected to engage in what
may plainly be called irrational and counterproductive behavior.
Thus, they would not ordinarily insist upon a loan agreement with
terms so harsh as to be unconscionable, or seek to terminate prematurely a loan agreement even in the face of a material default by
the borrower. It is within this basic framework that the legal issues
regarding loan agreements are herein discussed.
45. Money and Finance and Transfer of Real Resources for Development, International
Financial Co-operation for Development, Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat [UNCTAD
IV] (May 5, 1976) (mimeo only) 17, U.N. Doc. TD/188 (1975).
46. This fear was expressed by a Brussels-based analyst commenting on the borrowings
of the Soviet Bloc. Janssen, supra note 18, at 20. However, the chairman of Citicorp, unconvinced of any multiplier effect, recently commented:
They said floating exchange rates would dry up world trade. But they didn't. They
said the Eurodollar market was a dangerous monster that would destroy us all unless
tamed. But it hasn't. Now they say the developing countries will default on their
debts and collapse the whole banking system. Well, we here say it just won't happen.
Lewis, The Banker's Banker at Citicorp, N.Y. Times, March 6, 1977, § 3, at 5, col. 2.
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B. Loan Agreement Between a Private Bank and a Foreign
Government as a State Contract

Commenting on the status of the law in this field about a decade ago, the Committee on the Nationalization of Property, set up
by the American Branch of the International Law Association, made
the following observation:
No government would suggest that it has a legal right to breach
a loan agreement it concludes with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Can it seriously be contended that
a government has the legal "right" to breach a loan with the Chase
Manhattan Bank? Acceptance of the argument that the former contract is intergovernmental, and consequently governed by international law, while the latter has but one government as a party, and
consequently is governed by municipal law, even if formalistically
satisfying-as it is not-adds nothing to the rule of international
law. 47

This statement was made at a time when a clear distinction was
maintained between the status of an agreement made between a
state and an international organization, and one made between a
state and an alien natural or juridical ·person. The former, by virtue
of not being made subject to any local laws, is governed by public
international law and is labeled an international agreement. The
latter, by virtue of being subject to the laws of either the state
contractor or the local laws of another state chosen by the parties
to govern the agreement, is known as a state contract.
The question of the proper law of state contracts was the subject of a sophisticated doctrinal debate between two eminent attorneys, whose writings on the subject have done much in elucidating
this area of the law. A detailed discussion of the thesis by Dr. F. A.
Mann, that the international law remedy for state contracts is
sounded in tort and relies upon a supervening delict independent
and distinct from the contract (delictual remedy), 48 or the opposing
thesis by Professor R. Y. Jennings, that.an international law remedy
is sounded in contract (contractual remedy), 49 is beyond the scope
of this article. Since that debate, much has happened. It is now
possible to suggest that the prevailing view is. that a contract be47. 1957-1958 AM. BRANCH INT'L L.A. PRoc. CoMM. REP. 70.
48. Mann, State Contract and State Responsibility, 54 AM. J.
reprinted in F. MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 302 (1973).
49. Jennings, State Contracts in International Law, 37 BRIT. Y.B.
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tween a state and a foreigner may be governed by public international law, if the parties so intend. 50
This development of the law towards the "internationalization"
of state contracts, such as a loan agreement between a private commercial bank and a foreign government, must be seen as an effort
directed towards affording more protection for the interest of the
alien creditors by ensuring a means of enforcing and collecting
money through a remedy governed by a le'gal system which the
contracting state cannot freely alter. Local laws could conceivably
be altered to substantially change the creditors' rights. Additionally, a state government might possibly repudiate the debt on solid
or colorable grounds through domestic legislation. 51 For example,
assume a state has undertaken in a loan agreement to repay a loan
at an interest rate of 11 %. The state might, in seeking to ease its
internal economic problems, reduce the rate of interest in respect
to all loans by one-half. Since the loan agreement was governed by
the laws of that state and since that law is thus legitimately
changed, ,it would be difficult for the creditor to claim breach of
contract if the state does not thereafter pay the original 11 % rate of
interest. Clearly in such a case, "though common sense suggests
that there has been a breach of contract, there is yet no breach
according to the proper law. " 52
The "internationalization" of state contracts so as to make
them subject to public international law would thus prevent such
situations from arising. Domestic legislation of a state contractor
would not affect the international obligation assumed by the state
because of the well-settled rule of public international law, ordained
by the Permanent Court of International Justice, to the effect that
no state can rely on its own legislation to limit the scope of its
international obligation. 53 However, it is still open to serious doubt
whether, by agreeing to make a contract with a foreign company
subject to international law, a state thereby assumes an international obligation. The precise consequences and effects of
"internationalization" of state contracts are still unclear and re50.

About the Proper Law of Contracts Between States, in STUDIES IN INTERNA241 (1973).
51. For a discussion of the dangers of lending to developing countries as they were
articulated fifty years ago, see C. Hyde, The Negotiation of External Loans with Foreign
Governments, in 1 INT'L L.A. REP. THIRTY-FIRST CONF. 349 (1923).
52. Jennings, supra note 49, at 157.
53. Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, [1930] P.C.I.J., ser.
A, No. 24.
F. MANN,

TIONAL LAW
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quire further scrutiny.
Draftsmen have searched for appropriate applicable law
clauses. 54 Clauses which provide for third party arbitration as the
method for settlement of disputes have also been used. 55 However,
the designation of applicable law or the choice of a disputes settlement procedure and forum does not end the drafting problems.
There is the question of whether sovereign immunity bars all
claims by a private lender against a sovereign state borrower, notwithstanding the sophistication of the choice of law and forum
clauses present in the loan agreement itself. 56
Unlike the question of "internationalization" of state contracts,
which commentators have thoroughly discussed, 57 the problem of
the changing attitudes on the concept of sovereign immunity still
requires further elucidation, especially in light of the rejection of the
prior practice of subjecting contracts to municipal law systems. 58
The forces which have encouraged the liberalization of state contracts for the purposes of protecting the legal interests of the alien
contractor are also behind the current trend towards a relaxed view
on the scope of sovereign immunity in the context of state contracts.
C.

New Attitudes Towards Sovereign Immunity

The following framework for introducing international bankers
to the risks of sovereign immunity was first announced, in 1812, by
54. The idea championed by Professor Verdross that a contract can create its own independent legal system, "lex contractus," which exhaustively regulates the relationship between the parties has been criticized as being "doctrinally so unattractive, so impracticable,
so subversive of public international law, so dangerous from the point of view of legal policy
and so unnecessary that its novelty will not cause surprise." Mann, The Proper Law of
Contracts Concluded by International Persons, 35 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 34, 49 (1959), reprinted
in F. MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 211, 230 (1973).
55. For more discussion of third party arbitration agreements, see Mann, State Contracts and International Arbitration, 42 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 4-6 (1967), reprinted in F.
MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 256, 260-62 (1973).
56. See generally Harfield, Legal Aspects of International Lending, in OFFSHORE LENDING
BY U.S. COMMERCIAL BANKS 81 (F. Mathis ed. 1975); Schmidt, Legal Protection of Doans to
Developing Country Borrowers, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 575 (1974).
57. See notes 47-56 supra and accompanying text. See generally G. DELAUME, LEGAL
ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LENDING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FINANCING (1967).
58. Reference is being made here, for example, to the initial practice followed by the
IBRD of making loan agreements with member governments subject to the law of New York.
This practice has now been abandoned. G. DELAUME, supra note 57, at 84-85; R. LAVALLE, LA
BANQUE MONDIALE ET SES FILLIALES: ASPECTS JURIDIQUES ET FONCTIONNEMENT 226 (1973). The
IBRD now effectively makes a loan agreement with a member government subject to international law and removes it from the reach of municipal law. See 1 G. DELAUME, TRANSNATIONAL
CONTRACTS: APPLICABLE LAW & SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES § 1.10, at 35 (1976).
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the United States Supreme Court in Schooner Exchange v.
M cFaddon: 59
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not
imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an
external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the
extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to
the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction.
All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a
nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent
of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source.
This consent may be either express or implied. In the latter
case, it is less determinate, exposed more to the uncertainties of
construction; but, if understood, not less obligatory.
The world being composed of distinct sovereignties, possessing
equal rights and equal independence, whose mutual benefit is promoted by intercourse with each other, and by an interchange of
those good offices which humanity dictates and its wants require,
all sovereigns have consented to a relaxation in practice, in cases
under certain peculiar circumstances, of that absolute and complete
jurisdiction within their respective territories which sovereignty
confers.
This consent may, in some instances, be tested by common
usage, and by common opinion, growing out of that usage.
A nation would justly be considered as violating its faith, although that faith might not be expressly plighted, which should
suddenly and without previous notice, exercise its territorial powers
in a manner not consonant to the usages and received obligations
of the civilized world.
This full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the
attribute of every sovereign, and being incapable of conferring extraterritorial power, would not seem to contemplate foreign sovereigns
nor their sovereign rights as its objects. One sovereign being in no
respect amenable to another; and being bound by obligations of the
highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nation, by placing
59. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136-37 (1812). The judgment was delivered by Chief Justice
Marshall. The Exchange, a merchant vessel expropriated by the French government and
converted into a warship, was libeled by its former American owners while docked at the port
of Philadelphia. The Attorney General, acting for the Department of State, filed with the
Court a suggestion that the ship be held immune from suit. Speaking for a unanimous Court,
Chief Justice Marshall held that warships of friendly foreign nations, in a port of the United
States, are exempt from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States unless the executive indicates a contrary desire. Subsequently, a suggestion and a certificate of the Department of State, to the effect that it recognizes and accepts a foreign government's claim of
sovereign immunity, was held as binding upon United States courts.
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himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can
be supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an express license, or in the confidence that the immunities belonging to his
independent sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are
reserved by implication, and will be extended to him.

Since first announced, this principle has influenced the development of both British and continental jurisprudence. 80 As a result
of this influence, capital-exporting states have adopted new attitudes in their application of the principle of sovereign immunity.
This change of attitude is based on the following fact: "As the
economic and financial activities of the public sector expand, countries themselves have limited immunity for some operations of the
state, so that their own citizens may enjoy legal redress." 81 This
development in the domestic sphere has spilled over into the international sphere. Today, capital-exporting states have lead the way
in encouraging limitation of the principle of state sovereignty for the
purpose of affording legal redress to their nationals doing business
with foreign governments.
Two views have been maintained with respect to this concept.
The "absolute theory" of sovereign immunity grants to a sovereign
state immunity from all suits. Plaintiffs are barred from instituting
any claims in court against a foreign government on the grounds
that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain such a suit. The immunity is thus absolute, both with respect to actions in personam
and also proceedings in rem, against a sovereign state for execution.
The absolute theory is to be distinguished from the "restrictive
theory" of sovereign immunity. Under the restrictive theory, a distinction is made between public acts of a state, acts jure imperii,
and commercial activities of a state, acts jure gestionis. A sovereign
state is entitled to immunity with respect to acts jure imperii, but
is not entitled to immunity from suit with respect to acts jure
gestionis. 82 Complete immunity from execution of property, never60. See notes 61-87 infra and accompanying text.
61. Greene, supra note 44, at 210.
62. In Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945), both the Department of State
and the Supreme Court of the United States refused to recognize the claimed immunity of a
vessel owned, but not operated, by a foreign state. In 1952, Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor
of the Department of State, announced that the Department of State would grant certificates
of immunity only to public or governmental acts. Such certificates would not be available
for private or commercial acts. 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952). In 1955, the Supreme Court,
in National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955), extended the rule to include
the non-recognition of sovereign immunity in cases involving counterclaims limited to the
amount of the claims and arising out of the same transaction.
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theless, remains.
The development of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity has become increasingly important in the context of the loan
agreements with developing countries, since in most cases the borrowers of the loans are governments themselves. 63 Problems immediately arise over the question of the applicable standard for distinguishing acts jure imperii from acts jure gestionis. 64 The restrictive
theory has been criticized as being too vague in respect to this
problem.
Various attempts have been made to delimit the application of
sovereign immunity. These efforts can be seen in the European
Convention on State Immunity, 65 the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of the United States, 66 and in a recent English Court decision. 67
The European Convention on State Immunity set forth the specific
cases in which the plea of sovereign immunity would not be available. These include cases:
(i) which the state itself initiates, albeit by way of certain counterclaims;
(ii) to which the state has agreed to submit;
(iii) in which the state has taken steps relating to the merits;
(iv) which "relate to an obligation of the state which, by virtue of
a contract, falls to be discharged in the territory of the state of the
forum;''
(v) which relate to a contract of employment to be performed in
the state of the forum;
(vi) which concern matters arising from the state's participation
in a company, association or other legal entity;
63. The same holds true with respect to East European countries which, although subscribing to the theory of absolute immunity, have agreed to submit themselves to foreign
jurisdiction by a number of bilateral agreements with the Western countries. For a discussion
of the Eastern European cases, see Lissitzyn, Sovereign Immunity as a Norm of International
f,aw, in TRANSNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PHILIP c. JESSUP
192-93 (W. Friedmann ed. 1972).
64. In Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 381 U.S . 934 (1965), a "purpose" test was recommended. Under this test, the court
determines whether the purpose of the activity in question was commercial or public. The
purpose test was found wanting by Congress and was therefore abandoned. See Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976). Under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act the test employed determines whether the true "nature" of the particular
transaction in question is commercial or governmental. Id.
65. 3 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTIONS AND AGREEMENTS 54 (1972), reprinted
in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 470 (1972). For further discussion, see Mann, infra note 68; Sinclair,
The European Convention on State Immunity, 22 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 254 (1973).
66. 28 U .S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976).
67. Trendtex Trading Corp. Ltd. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, [1977] 1 All E.R. 881 (C.A.).
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(vii) which relate to the industrial, commercial or financial activity of an office, agency or other establishment in the state of the
forum;
(viii) which relate to a patent or other industrial property of the
defendant state;
(ix) which relate to immovable property in the forum state;
(x) which relate to property arising by way of succession, gift or
bona vacantia;
(xi) which relate to redress for injury caused to the person or tangible property in the state of the forum by a wrongdoer present in such
territory at the time of the occurrence;
(xii) which relate to arbitration pursuant to a submission in writing;
(xiii) which concern the administration of property in which a contracting state has a right or interest. 88

In spite of the numerous qualifications and exceptions that exist,
the effort is clearly to increase instances in which the plea for sovereign immunity would be restricted, thus opening the door for a
greater num her of legal actions involving sovereign states or their
entities.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is a significant step for
the United States, a country that has long adopted the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity. Commenting on the Act, the following observation was made:
The purpose of sovereign immunity in modern international law
is . . . to promote the functioning of all governments by protecting
a state from the burden of defending lawsuits abroad which are
based on its public acts. However, when the foreign state enters the
marketplace or when it acts as a private party would, there is no
justification in the modern international law of sovereign immunity
for allowing the foreign state to avoid the economic costs of the
agreements it breaches or of the accidents it creates; the law should
not permit the foreign state to shift these everyday burdens of the
marketplace onto the shoulders of private parties. 89

The Act attempts to offer a new definition of acts jure gestionis.
Section 1603 defines commercial activity as a regular course of com68. Mann, New Developments in the Law of Sovereign Immunity, 36 Moo. L. REV. 18,
21-22 (1973) (footnotes omitted).
69. Leigh, Department Testifies on Foreign Sovereign Immunities Bill, 74 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 826, 828 ( 1976). For further discussion, see Atkeson, Perkins & Wyatt, H. R. 11315-The
Revised State-Justice Bill on Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Time for Action, 70 AM. J. INT'L
L. 298 (1976); Delaume, Public Debt and Sovereign Immunity: Some Considerations Pertinent to H.R. 11315, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 529 (1976).
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mercial transaction. 70 The commercial character of an activity is
determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or
particular transaction, rather than by reference to its purpose. 71
Commercial activity carried on in the United States by a foreign
state is defined as commercial activity carried on by such state and
having substantial contact with the United States. 72
Sections 1605 and 1607 deal with exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign sovereign state, and enumerate the
following cases in which the defense of sovereign immunity will not
be accepted in United States courts. They include cases (i) in which
the foreign state has waived its immunity, either explicitly or by
implication; 73 (ii) involving commercial activity carried out in the
United States by a foreign state; 74 (iii) involving an act performed
in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of a
foreign state elsewhere; 75 (iv) involving an act performed outside the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of a foreign
state elsewhere, which act causes a direct effect in the United
States; 78 (v) in which the rights in property taken in violation of
international law are in issue and that property or any property
exchanged for such property is in the United States in connection
with a commercial activity being carried out by a foreign state in
the United States; 77 (vi) in which rights in property in the United
States acquired by succession or gift or rights in immovable property situated in the United States are in issue; 78 (vii) in which money
damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or
death, or damage or loss of property, occurring in the United States,
having been caused by tortious acts or omissions of a foreign state
or its agents modified by certain statutory exceptions; 79 (viii) involving counterclaims arising out of an action initiated by a foreign state
in the courts of the United States, having regard however to the
specific instances enumerated in the statute; 80 and (ix) attachment
of property in the United States in aid of execution to satisfy a final
70. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976).
71. Id.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 1603(e).
§ 1605(a)(l).
§ 1605(a)(2).

§
§
§
§

1605 (3).
1605 (4).
1605 (5).
1607.
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judgment against a foreign state, provided the property was being
used by the foreign state in a "commercial activity" as defined in
the statute, or falls within the category of property with respect to
which defense of sovereign immunity is already denied for many of
the reasons mentioned in (i)-(viii) above. 81
Similar to the result reached in the European Convention, the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is designed to further limit the
defense of sovereign immunity. Apart from providing a new standard for determining acts jure gestionis, the Act does three other
important things. The courts are vested exclusively with jurisdiction over the issue of sovereign immunity. 82 The Act contains an
elaborate guide to the methods for obtaining personal jurisdiction
over a foreign state defendant. It departs from the traditional American position by providing a remedy of execution to satisfy a final
judgment against a foreign state. In sum, the distinction made between acts jure imperii and acts jure gestionis is now codified and
expanded for the purposes of allowing more judicial remedies for
Americans against foreign sovereign states.
This new attitude towards relaxing the application of sovereign
immunity is also reflected in Great Britain, a country which had,
for a long time, followed the absolute theory. In 1919, the British
Court of Appeal ruled, in the Porto Alexandre case, 83 that a stateowned trading vessel, which was in the possession of a foreign state
at the time of its arrest, was entitled to immunity. This theory of
absolute immunity guided the English courts until very recently. In
1975, for example, the Court of Appeal, in Thai-Europe Tapioca
Service Ltd. v. Pakistan, 84 held that absolute immunity, rather than
qualified or restricted immunity, was the rule in England and Wales
absent a declaration to the contrary by the House of Lords. However, certain Law Lords advocated the abandonment of the absolute
theory.
A step in that direction was taken in 1976, in Philippine Admiral v. Wallem Shipping (Hong Kong) Ltd., 85 decided by the Privy
81. Id. § 1610.
82. Formerly, the State Department exercised some control in this area. See note 62
supra. Professor McDowell criticized this practice as outdated. McDowell, Contemporary
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 817, 818 (1976) .
See also Leigh & Sandler, Dunhill: Towards a Reconsideration of Sabbatino, 16 VA. J. INT'L
L. 685 (1976); 3 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 77 (1976).
83. (1920] P. 30 (C.A.).
84. [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1485, [1975] 3 All E.R. 961 (C.A.).
85. [1976] 2 W.L.R. 214, [1976] 1 All E.R. 78.
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Council of the Commonwealth. The Privy Council, upon referral of
the case from the Hong Kong Supreme Court, adopted the restrictive theory in holding that a state-owned merchant ship engaged in
ordinary commercial activity was not entitled to immunity as a
defense in an in rem proceeding. The next important British decision came in 1977, in Trendtex Trading Corporation Ltd. v. Central
Bank of Nigeria. 86
The plaintiffs in Trendtex were one of eighty suppliers who
contracted in early 1975 to supply the government of Nigeria with
a total of 20 million tons of cement. The defendant bank had provided an irrevocable letter of credit in favor of the plaintiffs for the
total purchase price of the cement. In July of 1975, a new administration took over in Nigeria. The new regime, faced with serious
congestion of shipping affecting all of its ports, introduced a system
of import controls for cement and instructed the bank to refuse
payments for consignments which were not actually authorized
under the newly introduced controls.
The plaintiffs brought an action against the Central Bank of
Nigeria claiming, inter alia, damages of $13,968,190 for the bank's
repudiation of the irrevocable letter of credit. An injunction was
granted to the plaintiffs ordering the bank to retain the stated sum
or its equivalent in order to meet the claim. The bank applied for a
discharge of the injunction and moved to set aside the proceedings
on the ground that the bank was a department of the Nigerian state
and thereby entitled to sovereign immunity.
Applying the absolute theory of sovereign immunity, Justice
Donaldson held for the bank, which he regarded as an agent of the
government of Nigeria. 87 The Court of Appeal reversed and reinstated the original order, thus allowing the proceedings against the
bank. Their Lordships found that the Central Bank of Nigeria was
not to be regarded as a department of the state and was, therefore,
not immune.
Trendtex does not, however, clearly establish that England has
adopted the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. The three
Appeal Justices were not unanimous in their reasoning in denying
the immunity defense. Lord Justice Stephenson, while agreeing that
the restrictive theory is more just, was unwilling to accept it as a
86. [197711 All E.R. 881 (C .A.).
87. Trendtex Trading Corp. Ltd. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, [1976] 1 W.L.R. 868, [1976]
3 All E.R. 437.
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rule of English law until either the House of Lords or the legislature
had so acted.
Master of the Rolls Lord Denning was, however, more emphatic
and decisive in his acceptance of the restrictive theory. Joined by
Lord Justice Shaw, Lord Denning disagreed with the view adopted
by Lord Justice Stephenson that rules of international law could
only be considered if incorporated into English law by the decision
of the Judges, by acts of Parliament, or by long established custom.
In their view, the rules of international law were automatically incorporated into English law unless they were in conflict with an act
of Parliament. They both urged that England should not be left
behind in the development of new attitudes aimed towards limiting
the application of sovereign immunity to offer more protection to
those trading with governments or state-enterprises. The Trendtex
decision may be said to have laid a firm ground for the abandonment of absolute immunity in England. The case illustrates one
crucial problem-who is entitled to immunity, only the governments themselves, or are their political subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies included?
The rationale behind the trend towards relaxing the concept of
sovereign immunity., and the metamorphosis of the internationalization of state contracts is clear. The two developments in this
area of international law are aimed at affording more protection and
ensuring effective legal remedies for the nationals of the capitalexporting states. However, these developments are still far from the
complete legal protection being sought.
D.

A Checklist of Crucial Loan Agreement Provisions

The following is an illustrative checklist of the provisions which
are found in loan agreements. The comments are offered in the
context of a suggested approach for their use.
1. The Purpose Clause. This clause contains a clear statement of
the purpose or purposes for which the loan is required. 88 From the
88. The purposes for government borrowing may include the following:
Economic infrastructure loans, possibly self-liquidating are usually project loans
that finance construction, expansion and modernization of airports, subways, railroads, port facilities, and such sophisticated innovations as microwave and other
telecommunications projects and atomic energy facilities.
Economic and social infrastructure loans, not directly self-liquidating, are also
usually project loans for such purposes as the construction, expansion and modernization of highways, sewer systems, multipurpose dams, water supply systems and
bridges.
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lender's viewpoint, the clause must be unambiguous so that it becomes easily used as a vehicle for determining the nature of the
economic performance expected of the borrower and the economic
effects119 of the loan itself. Thus, it is relevant in the context of what
surveillance and supervision the lender may undertake upon the
economic development of the borrower. From the borrower's viewpoint, the purpose clause of the loan agreement must reflect the
discretion which a sovereign state is usually allowed to exercise in
connection with the use of its resources in the manner it deems fit
for its national development. In this context, the purpose clause
must be flexible enough to allow the borrower to make necessary
adjustments in its use of the loan within the scope of its entire
development program. Developing countries may be compelled by
changing circumstances to make adjustments in their national economic programs. These adjustments need not be a negative concern
of the lender. Reasonable flexibility in the application of the loan
is desirable for both parties.
2. Repayment Clause. The repayment clause must be carefully
drafted in order to protect the lender's interest in repayment. It
General social welfare loans normally are project loans and finance construction
of, for example, schools, health facilities and low-cost housing.
General budget support to central government ordinarily is short-term finance
extended in anticipation of budgetary receipts. Usually these loans will be repaid
when the normal activities of the public sector of the country result in receipt of
foreign exchange revenues, as from petroleum, minerals or commodity exports. Depending upon internal legislation or government policy in the borrowing country, this
may be with or without attribution to a capital budget.
Loans to create foreign exchange to finance seasonal export/import variations,
in the early years of this type of financing, were commonly restricted to short-term
financing of anticipated foreign exchange receipts from exports of a specific crop.
Now, frequently, this credit is in the form of bank credit lines, reviewed annually, to
provide for seasonal foreign exchange accommodation on the basis of the borrowing
country's over-all foreign trade cycle. However, since the first purpose of a country's
foreign exchange reserves is to finance just such seasonal swings, the need for this
type of financing is prima facie evidence of concern on the part of the financial
authorities of the country about the level of net exchange reserves or about conditions
in the country which could adversely affect reserves.
Reconstruction and economic development loans may be either project or program types. Interest rates and terms are related to the borrower's needs and general
creditworthiness. Purposes include rebuilding following natural and human disasters
of earthquake, flood, drought and war, or to finance the elements of economic growth.
Loans often are from public sources but frequently from private as well. They may
be with or without subsequent attribution to specific individual projects, or they may
finance a group of projects which collectively contribute to achievement of the program objectives.
Greene, supra note 44, at 189.
89. See note 37 supra.
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must also satisfactorily protect the borrower's interest by providing
for some flexibility in the repayment schedule in order to avoid the
harsh impact that unforseen problems may have on their ability to
meet its terms. This clause should include a provision which allows
for renegotiation of the loan repayment schedule and terms, thereby
avoiding default situations. The inclusion of a renegotiation clause
in a loan agreement has, however, been found undesirable by international bankers. They feel that defaults will be avoided by mutual
trust and understanding between the lender and the borrower. Although the bankers feel that renegotiation may be a distinctive
possibility, they are unwilling to spell out the terms for renegotiation at the time of the drafting of the loan agreement.
The need for flexibility must be seen as a benefit for both the
lender and the borrower; both should be interested in the survival
of the money market. "Cross-defaults" clauses, "guaranty" clauses,
and "negative pledge" clauses, usually found in the loan agreement,
are extremes to be avoided since they represent preoccupation
with the protection of the interest of the lender only. The proper
approach should be to maintain the relationship between the
borrower and the lender created out of the terms of the loan agreement, and thus avoid a premature termination of this relationship
.on technical grounds. Such a termination fails to provide necessary
attention to the economic problems of one of the parties, usually
that of the borrower.
3. Applicable Law. Due to the trend towards the internationalization of state contracts, this question requires frank discussion
by both of the parties to the loan agreement. This entire issue revolves around the problem of an adequate remedy. The lender is not
willing to risk the value of all of the covenants, guaranties and
securities written into the agreement by making the agreement itself
subject to the local laws of the contracting developing states, which
are often regarded as incapable of ensuring justice and subject to
unpredictable alteration. The alternatives are to choose the law of
the state of the lender; or the law of the borrower, frozen at the time
of the conclusion of the agreement to provide a debatable "legal
enclave" for the agreement in the event of subsequent changes in
the law; or the laws of a third state. Alternatively, it is possible to
make the loan contract subject to public international law, that is,
the general principles of law recognized by the major legal systems
of the world.
What emerges is a complex picture, observed in the following
statement:
Determination of the applicable law is, in the contractual field,
one way to accomplish this objective. Faced with the complexities
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of conflicts rules, and subject to certain limitations of which the
parties or their counsel should be aware at the outset, the parties to
transnational contracts may, by clearly stipulating the law applicable to the relationship between them, have the reasonable expectation that their choice will be left undisturbed. So much the more if
the choice of law is coupled with that of an appropriate forum. A
stipulation of applicable law may thus serve as a guide to the judge
or the arbitrator and place the author of the stipulation in the most
favorable position in the event of litigation. In the case of most
contracts of adhesion and standardized forms of contracts, this last
consideration is probably the consideration paramount. However, it
should not be inferred from this remark that stipulations of applicable law, even when they are supplemented by a choice of forum or
an arbitration clause, are necessarily and exclusively intended to
anticipate the judicial or arbitral outcome of contractual disputes.
There are situations in which the parties operate in a climate of
trust and cooperation rather than competition and have no wish to
see their relations disturbed by unnecessary friction, least of all by
a lawsuit. Examples are business relations of long standing conducted in a spirit of good faith that the parties are anxious to maintain and long-term contracts closely associating the parties in the
pursuit of long-range objectives. In this type of situation, the initial
identification of the applicable law may remove at the outset a
factor of potential controversy. It may enable the parties, in full
knowledge of the legal perimeter within which they must conduct
their relations, to seek an amicable and mutually satisfactory settlement to possible disagreements between them.
In addition to these fundamental objectives of the contractual
choice-of-law process, stipulations of applicable law may also serve
another purpose. Certainty or at least predictability of results regarding the proper law of the contract may be of little assistance to
the parties if, the choice having been made, the content of the proper law is changed to such an extent as to alter significantly the
economy of the relationship. This consideration is of the utmost
importance in the case of long-term contracts and will require discussion in that context. It may be relevant also in respect of ordinary
commercial transactions, particularly in the context of currency
fluctuations, such as those which have arisen in recent years.
In the handling of these two aspects of the problem, the parties
do not enjoy the same degree of autonomy. Except in special cases
involving contracts between private persons and foreign sovereign
and subject to the law of the sovereign contracting party where
"stabilization" devices are sometimes used, it is generally agreed
that the proper law chosen by the parties applies as it exists from
time to time and not merely as it stands at the time of the contract.
Under the circumstances, anticipating the possible impact of the
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol5/iss2/3

28

Adede: Loan Agreements Between Developing Countries and Foreign Commerci

1978]

Loan Agreements

263

time element upon the content of the proper law becomes somewhat
of a considerate guess, or more accurately risk, that must be assessed at the time of contracting but with respect to which the
parties have preciously little discretion. 110

4. Disputes Settlement Clause. Subject to the freedom of choice
to be exercised by the parties, settlement of disputes of a loan agreement between a government and a private foreign bank may increasingly result from arbitration, relying upon an arbitration agreement created by the parties themselves under the contract. 91 These
agreements govern the submission of the disputes, the constitution
of the tribunal, the validity of the award, its enforcement, interpretation, revision, annulment, the procedures to be followed, and define the applicable law. 92 The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, established under the Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 93 under the auspices of the World Bank, has
attempted to facilitate the use of arbitration in loan agreement
disputes, 94 although certain developing countries have not yet found
90. 1 G. DELAUME, supra note 58, at § 1.01 (footnotes omitted). The point made by
Delaume in the quoted text.relates also to the question of the internationalization of state
contracts by stipulating international law as the proper law. The process of internationalization may, nevertheless, be complicated when the parties, in the exercise of their autonomy, adopt the technique of "depecage" (segregation of issues), recognized in municipal
contract law, and thereby stipulate to two or more applicable laws in a single contract. The
parties could thus stipulate international law as the proper law but then segregate certain
issues which, for practical reasons, must be governed by some designated system of municipal
law. A loan agreement contemplating the issue of bonds would be a good example in which
the validity of the main loan agreement would be governed, for example, by international law,
while the law governing the bonds would be that of the local markets in which they are issued.
91. The following analysis elucidates upon this point:
In recent years the contractual character of arbitration has become recognized
and party autonomy has conquered new grounds theretofore denied to it under the
judicial approach to the problem. Modern statutes and treaty provisions, together
with enlightened judicial decisions, increasingly and relentlessly have given new
dimensions to party autonomy in an effort to cope with the needs of trasnational
[sic] commerce and eradicate from national systems a former parochialism out of
context with the necessities of contemporary economic and commercial relations.
Progress, which is still in the making, has not always been smooth and the path
travelled has often been uneven and sometimes somewhat chaotic.
2 G. DELAUME, supra note 58, at § 13.01. This is a contradistinction to an attempt to apply
the law of a donor country to a loan agreement. For a discussion of the loan agreement
between Denmark and Malawi, see F. MANN, supra note 50.
92. For further discussion, see 1 G. DELAUME, supra note 58, at 179; F. MANN, supra note
55.
93. Done March 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.l.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (opened
for signature Aug. 27, 1965; entered into force (U.S.) Oct. 14, 1966).
94. For further discussion, see Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of
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it possible to submit to the jurisdiction of the Centre. However,
private lenders still reject arbitration and prefer settlement by competent local courts. Courts are regarded as better suited for the
quick resolution of loan disputes. The ad hoc arbitral tribunals take
considerably longer to constitute and decide the claim. 95
Additionally, the banks seem to have adopted the view that, in
a dispute concerning a loan, there is really nothing to arbitrate.
Either the borrower is under the obligation to pay the loan and he
performs accordingly, or the consequence of failure to so perform as
stipulated in the agreement must be allowed to operate as determined by a judge in a court of law. An ad hoc arbitral tribunal,
being an institution created by the will of the parties to the dispute
would, in their view, tend to consider questions of equity and other
factors that may militate against the immediate interest of the
banks in securing performance in accordance with the terms of the
agreement. Thus, banks would prefer settlement through proceedings before a court of law.
In this context, the issue of sovereign immunity becomes crucial. Certain commercial banks in fact insist upon a sovereign immunity waiver clause in a loan agreement. This is usually rebuffed
by the sovereign state borrower as an affront. Indeed, such a requirement is an affront. Mutual trust between the parties would make
unnecessary such a clause. The main aim should be to find a meaningful interplay between the applicable law clause and the dispute
settlement clause in the agreement.
5. Representations and Warranties Clauses. These clauses contain
statements made by the borrower as to financial and other pertinent
considerations, fixing the responsibility for the truth and accuracy
of the statements on the borrower.
6. Covenants Clauses. Affirmative covenants are promises by the
borrower to perform certain actions, either automatically or at the
request of the lender. Their principal purpose is to provide the
lender, at the outset of the loan and during its course, with information indicating the general credit worthiness of the borrower. Negative covenants, such as restrictions on working capital, additional
borrowings, guarantees, dividends, and cross-default clauses have a
basic aim of tightening the hold of the lender over the actions of the
Investment, 136 RECUEIL DEs CouRS 330 (1972); Kahn, The Law Applicable to Foreign Investments: The Contribution of the World Bank Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes, 44 IND. L.J. 1 (1968).
95. For further discussion, see 1 G. DELAUME, supra note 58, at 179-97.
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borrower. Although somewhat restrictive, the extent to which these
clauses are used in any individual case is, in practicality, a matter
of discretion on the part of the bank.
7. Events of Default Clauses. This section refers to the defaults
capable of occurring and their appropriate remedies. Although the
breaking of covenants is usually an event of default, loan agreements will generally stipulate that the bank notify the borrower,
and in certain instances allow a grace period for correction. In other
cases, though, the clause might provide that appropriate remedial
action is to take effect at the moment of default.

III.

CONCLUSION

In discussing the economic and legal issues concerning the debt
problems of the developing countries, in general, and the loan agreements between such countries and foreign, private commercial
banks, certain ideas emerge which merit consideration. The non-oil
developing countries should not be lumped together in a discussion
of their debt problems and suggested solutions. Levels of development and economic potentials are important factors which distinguish the non-oil developing countries from each other, thereby
demanding a case-by.-case approach. The concept of a generalized
solution is to be avoided, except as suggested by UNCTAD.
Additionally, available evidence indicates that many of the
loans from the American commercial banks have gone to the nonoil developing countries in the high-income group. These countries
are capable of diversifying their economic structures and are able
to take corrective measures, if necessary, to restore their balance of
payments equilibrium. Using this as a criterion for lending, it would
seem that the non-oil developing countries in the low-income group
would not be customers of the commercial banks. This is, however,
not the case. The banks appear to be so liquid that they are able to
loan to almost any of the non-oil developing countries. A situation
to be avoided is one in which commercial banks only lend either to
the non-oil "rich" developing countries, or only lend to the non-oil
"poor" developing countries exclusively. The dangers of this practice have been clearly pointed out in the UNCTAD study.
The tendency to redirect existing aid flows to certain "poor"
developing countries, coupled with the increasing concentration of
private flows to resource-rich countries would have serious consequences. First, a large number of developing countries would be
excluded from such a selective "bailing-out" procedure. Secondly,
the amounts of additional assistance that can be made available to
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the "poor" developing countries by redistributing a given total,
would be hardly enough to sustain current levels of income per
capita. Thus, these countries would be condemned to perpetual poverty. Thirdly, countries that may be forced to rely almost exclusively on private capital might experience "immiserizing growth"
characterized by lopsided production patterns and income distribution, by heavy external dependence, and by social instability.
In order to counteract these alarming trends, a firm political
commitment is required from all developed countries, and especially
the major donors, to the objectives of financial co-operation of the
Second United Nations Development Decade. In this context, particular emphasis should be placed on (a) the early attainment of the
0.7 per cent target for official development assistance; and (b) the
distribution of such assistance among developing countries on the
basis of objective criteria including, inter alia, differences in levels
of development; capacity usefully to absorb private flows and service the associated debt; and the need to assure equitable distribution of income. 96

The commercial bankers should reassess their willingness to
grant loans to the non-oil developing countries on short terms and
high rates. The money borrowed under such terms cannot easily be
used in long-term development projects which take time to repay.
The existing lending terms seem to encourage consumption of the
loans in short-term activities and not in longer term projects capable of enabling the borrowers to generate new export earnings to
repay their debts.
There is clearly a need to combine various sources of funding
when dealing with the debt problems of developing countries. There
should be an increase in official development loans, improved compensatory financing by the IMF, including additional amounts
under the tranches of the countries themselves and the funds from
the commercial banks on flexible terms. 117
Two tasks lie ahead. The short-term task is to get the loans of
the less developed countries rescheduled past the "bunching up"
period of the next two years. Thereafter, the economies of the debtridden countries must be helped to adjust to the new energy costs.
They need not only loans but discipline, pressure and guidance.
Private banks, even in consortium, will not have the weight. This is
a job for governments and, above all, intergovernmental agencies. 911

96. Money and Finance and Transfer of Real Resources for Development, International
Financial Co-operation for Development, Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat [UNCTAD
IVJ (May 5, 1976) (mimeo only) 23, U.N. Doc. TD/188 (1975).
97. See generally The IMF Tries Again, ECONOMIST, March 26, 1977, at 87.
98. Railing Out Our Banks A broad, supra note 1, at 16, col. 1.
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There does not seem to be anything inimical in demanding discipline from the developing countries if the kind of surveillance required includes an analysis of the various effects of the loan. 111'
Practical economic considerations must be given attention in
the loan agreements between the commercial banks and the non-oil
developing countries. In this respect the parties should seek to create a working relationship; mutual trust among the parties should
be the guiding principle.
The discussion in this paper of the debt problems of non-oil
developing countries has included an analysis of various legal issues,
including the "internationalization" of state contracts, the trend
towards the acceptance of the restricted theory of sovereign immunity, and the increasing call for reliance upon ad hoc or permanent
arbitration as the mode for the settlement of disputes. All of these
issues center on the continuing search for more effective legal protection in the interest of the lenders. This should not lead to the
conclusion that only the lenders need have their interests protected.
The interests of the borrowers must also be protected by including
in the loan agreement flexible provisions allowing room for economic
adjustment. Such provisions would lead to the avoidance of default
situations and conditions resulting in the outcry of "Wall Street
imperialism."
The deliberate development of the law towards affording more
protection for foreign private investments should not be seen as a
phenomenon only serving the interests of western capital-exporting
nations. With the advent of the United Nations' encouragement of
technical cooperation among developing countries, 100 it is hoped that
the developing countries will increasingly become capital exporters
99. See notes 34-38 supra.
100. To the developing countries the challenge lies in accepting TCDC (Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries) as a new dimension for increasing and
diversifying development activities and opportunities for developing countries which
call for accommodation and democratic adjustment of old relations. If developing
countries do not act now to fulfil the goals ofTCDC as a movement then an opportunity for adding a new dimension to their development efforts will have been lost, and
with it all hopes for the realization of a new economic and social environment.
It is therefore imperative that TCDC be given immediate practical and sincere
expression in order to focus attention and shift the vortex of development activities
to where the action should be.
Technical Co-operation Among Developing Countries, Study on Rules, Regulations, Procedures and Practices of United Nations Development System in Recruiting Experts, Subcontracting, Procuring Equipment and Providing Fellowships [U.N. Development Programme]
(January, 1977) (mimeo only) (Agenda Item 10) i, U.N. Doc. DP/229 (1976).
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themselves . Accordingly, the development of the law towards protecting the interests of the capital exporters will be of benefit to the
developing countries as well.
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